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Abstract—In this work, we study spectrum auction problem
where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal,
and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and
the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful
mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or
maximize the revenue of the primary user. As the optimal conflict-
free spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, in this work, we
design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately
based on the following techniques: derandomized allocation from
integer programming formulation, its linear programming (LP)
relaxation, and the dual of the LP. We theoretically prove that
1) our near optimal allocation methods are bid monotone, which
implys truthful auction mechanisms; and 2) our near optimal
allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue
that is at least 1− 1
e
times of the optimal respectively. At last, we
conduct extensive simulations to study the performances (social
efficiency, revenue) of the proposed methods, and the simulation
results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
Index Terms—Spectrum auction, Truthful, Approximation
mechanism, Social efficiency, Revenue
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing demand for limited spectrum resource poses
a great challenge in spectrum allocation and usage [3]. One
of the most promising methods is spectrum auction, which
provides sufficient incentive for primary user (a.k.a seller)
to sublease spectrum to secondary users (a.k.a buyers). The
design of spectrum auction mechanisms are facing two major
challenges. First, spectrum channels can be reused in spatial,
temporal, and spectral domain if the buyers are conflict-free
with each other, and thus, allocating the requests of buyers
in channels optimally is often an NP-hard problem. Second,
truthfulness is regarded as one of the most critical properties,
however, it’s difficult to ensure truthfulness in a spectrum
auction mechanism with performance guarantee.
Many mechanisms were proposed to address some of these
challenges. For example, [6], [8], [10], [18]–[20], [25]–[27]
focused on truthfulness and spatial reuse. In [25], truthful
mechanism is designed for the spectrum spatial reuse, but no
performance guarantee on social efficiency and revenue. [1]
and [10] focused on maximizing revenue for the auctioneer,
and the social efficiency maximization problem was studied
in [8] and [27]. However, these results did not consider the
temporal reuse of the spectrum. In practice, the buyer will
employ temporal reuse to improve the utilization of spectrums.
Following in this direction, temporal reuse was considered
in [4], [5], [17], [21], [23]. However, most of the studies
that focused on temporal reuse assume that the conflict graph
of buyers’ geometry locations is a completed graph for each
channel, which means there is no spatial reuse. Feng et al. [6]
studied the case that spectrum can be reused both in spatial and
in temporal domains, and proposed a truthful double auction
mechanism for spectrum. Nevertheless, performance guarantee
is neglected in [6]. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no truthful spectrum auction mechanism with performance
guarantee, in which spectrums can be reused both in spatial
and temporal domains.
To tackle this challenge, we propose a truthful auction
framework for practical spectrum markets in this paper. Max-
imization of the social efficiency, i.e. allocating a channel to
buyers who value it most, and maximization of the expected
revenue, i.e. allocating a channel to buyers who pay it most,
both are the nature goals for spectrum auctions. Thus, we aim
at designing a framework that can flexibly choose the opti-
mization goal between social efficiency and expected revenue.
Then, we propose a set of channel allocation mechanisms
which can either maximize the social efficiency or the expected
revenue, and payment schemes which ensure the truthfulness
of our framework. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to design truthful spectrum auctions while considering
spatial and temporal reuse with performance guarantee.
In this work, we design a framework for spectrum auction
which can flexibly choose the optimization goal and the chan-
nel allocation and payment mechanism. Since channels can
be reused in both spatial and temporal domain, the problem
of allocating requests of buyers in channels optimally to
maximize the social efficiency or the expected revenue is NP-
hard. It is more complex than the problem of matching requests
and channels optimally only in spatial or temporal domain. To
tackle this challenge, we first relax the integer programming
formulation of the channel allocation problem into a linear
program (LP) problem, which is solvable in polynomial time.
A fractional solution for channel allocation can be obtained by
solving this LP optimally. Then, we transform this fractional
solution into a feasible integer solution of the original channel
allocation problem by using a carefully designed randomized
rounding procedure that ensures the feasibility of the solution
and good approximation to the objective functions. We prove
that the expected weight of the feasible integer solution is at
least 1 − 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution.
To complete our allocation mechanism, we also propose a
derandomization algorithm to get a feasible solution whose
weight is always guaranteed to be at least 1 − 1/e times
of the weight of the optimal solution. Then, we propose a
revised derandomization algorithm and prove that this new
allocation method does satisfy the bid-monotone property,
thus, implying a truthful mechanism. To ensure that the
payment mechanism is also solvable in polynomial time, we
further design a channel allocation and payment mechanism
CATE, which is truthful in expectation. We prove that the
expected weight of CATE’s solution is larger than 1−1/e times
of the optimal. We point out that our allocation mechanisms
can either approximate the social efficiency or the expected
revenue, but not both simultaneously.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II in-
troduces the preliminaries and our design objectives. Section
III presents our mechanism design framework for optimizing
the social efficiency or the revenue of the seller. In Section
IV, we propose our allocation algorithm, which is based
on derandomization of solutions from linear programming.
Section V presents our extensive simulations for evaluating the
social efficiency, revenue, and spectrum utilization efficiency
of our methods. We discuss the related literatures in Section
VI, and conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Spectrum Auction Model
Auctions in our model are executed periodically. In each
round, the primary user subleases the access right of m
channels in the fixed areas during time interval [0, T ], and
n buyers request the usage of channels in fixed time intervals
and geographical locations/areas. Our goal is to allocate these
requests of buyers in channels, such that we maximize either
the social efficiency or the expected revenue.
Assume each channel provided by the primary user has a
set of conflict-free license areas, and the primary user only
sells the rights to access his under-used channels in their
license areas. Moreover, these license areas between different
channels may have intersections. To make our model more
general, we consider two models of the requests of buyers.
The first one is the Point model, in which each buyer requests
the usage of channels in a particular geographical location and
during a fixed time interval. The second one is Area model, in
which each buyer requests the usage of channels in a particular
geographical area and also during a fixed time interval.
We use S to denote the set of channels, and define each
channel sj ∈ S as sj = (Rj , Aj), where Aj is its license
area, and Rj is the interference radius of a transmission when
a user transmits in channel sj . Let B be the set of buyers,
in which each buyer i ∈ B is assumed to have a request ri.
Let R be the set of requests of buyers. Each request ri ∈
R is defined as ri = (Li, bi, vi, ai, ti, di), where Li is i’s
geographical location in Point model or the area where i wants
to access the channel in the Area model, bi denotes its bidding
price, vi stands for its true valuation, and ai, di, and ti denote
the arrival time, deadline, and duration time (or time length),
respectively. In this paper, we only consider the case of di −
ai = ti, which means that the time request from the buyer is
a fixed time interval. We leave the case of di − ai > ti as the
future work.
We say that two requests ri and rk conflict with each
other, if they satisfy the following constrains: (1) the distance
between Li and Lk is smaller than twice of the interference
radius in the Point model, or Li
⋂
Lk 6= ∅ in the Area model;
and (2) the required time intervals from ri and rk overlap
with each other. We denote the conflict relationships among
requests by a conflict graph G = (V , E), where V is the
set of requests of buyers, and edge (ri, rk) ∈ E if requests
ri and rk conflict with each other. Note that, for the same
requests ri and rk, different interference radius of channels
will lead to a different conflict relationship. We use a matrix
Y = (yi,k,j)n×n×m to represent the conflict relationships in
graph G, in which if requests ri and rk conflict with each
other in channel sj , yi,k,j = 1; otherwise, yi,k,j = 0. Since
the spectrum is a local resource, we also need to define a
location matrix C = (ci,j)n×m to represent whether Li is in
the license regions of channel sj . ci,j = 1 if Li is in the
license regions of channel cj ; otherwise, ci,j = 0. Therefore,
two requests ri and rk can share channel sj only if yi,k,j = 0,
and ci,j = 1, ck,j = 1.
B. Problem Formulation
The objective of our work is to design a mechanism
satisfying truthfulness constraint, while maximizing the social
efficiency or revenue. An auction is said to be truthful if
revealing the true valuation is the dominant strategy for each
buyer, regardless of other buyers’ bids. It has been proved that
an auction mechanism is truthful if its allocation algorithm is
monotonic and it always charges critical values from its buyers
[14]. The critical value for a buyer is the minimum bid value,
with which the buyer will win the auction. In our problem
definition, truthfulness implies two aspects:
1) Buyers report their true valuations for the spectrum
channels (called value-Truthfulness)
2) Buyers report their true required time intervals (called
time-Truthfulness).
Social Efficiency Maximization: Social efficiency for an
auction mechanism M is defined as max
∑
ri∈R
vixi(M),
where xi(M) = 1 if buyer i wins; otherwise, xi(M) = 0.
Revenue Maximization: The revenue of an auction is the
total payment of buyers. An auction maximizing the revenue
for the auctioneer is known as an optimal auction in economic
theory [13]. In the optimal auction, Myerson introduces the
notion of virtual valuation φi(bi) as
φi(bi) = bi −
1− Fi(bi)
fi(bi)
(1)
where Fi(bi) is the probability distribution function of true
valuations of buyer i, and fi(bi) = dFi(bi)dbi .
According to the theory of optimal auction [13], maximiz-
ing revenue is equivalent to finding the optimal solution of
max
∑
ri∈R
φi(bi)xi(M). Notice that Fi should be regular for
each buyers i, that is, φi(bi) is monotone non-decreasing in bi.
In fact, this requirement is mild, and most natural distributions
of interest (uniform, exponential, Gaussian etc.) are regular.
III. A STRATEGYPROOF SPECTRUM AUCTION
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose a general truthful spectrum auc-
tion framework with the goal of maximizing social efficiency
or revenue, as shown in Algorithm 1. In our framework, we
can flexibly choose different optimization targets according to
the practical requirements of auction problems. The details are
depicted as follows.
Algorithm 1 Our truthful spectrum auction framework
Input: conflict graph G, location matrix C, set of channels
S, set of requests R, monotone allocation and payment
mechanism A;
Output: channel assignment X , payment P ;
1: R′ = R;
2: for each ri ∈ R do
3: pi = 0;
4: if the target is maximization of social efficiency then
5: φi(bi) = bi;
6: else
7: φi(bi) = bi −
1−Fi(bi)
fi(bi)
;
8: if φi(bi) < ηφti then
9: R′ = R′/ri;
10: Run A using the set of virtual bids {φi(bi)}ri∈R′ ;
11: Let X = (xi)ri∈R′ be the channel allocation and P˜ =
(p˜i)ri∈R′ be the corresponding payment returned by A;
12: for each xi = 1 do
13: if the target is maximization of social efficiency then
14: pi = p˜i;
15: else
16: pi = φ
−1
i (p˜i);
17: return (X,P );
At the beginning of every auction period, we choose a
particular optimization target. If we choose the social ef-
ficiency maximization as our target, we let the virtual bid
φi(bi) = bi. Then, we use the set of virtual bidsΦ = (φi(bi))n
as input to the channel allocation and payment calculation
mechanism A. A returns an optimal or feasible channel
allocation X = (xi)n, which maximizes
∑
ri∈R
φi(bi)xi. In
X, xi = 1 means that buyer i wins the auction, while xi = 0
means it loses. Meanwhile, A also returns a corresponding
payment vector P˜=(p˜i)n, and we charge each buyer pi = p˜i.
If we choose to maximize the revenue of the auctioneer, we
convert the bid of each buyer into its corresponding virtual
bid by setting φi(bi) = bi − 1−Fi(bi)fi(bi) . Then, we can use the
same allocation mechanism A in the case of social efficiency
maximization to maximize
∑
ri∈R
φi(bi)xi. To ensure the
worst case profit, we assume that the primary user already set
a virtual reservation price ηφ, which is the minimum virtual
price for spectrums per unit time. We take the requests whose
virtual bid is larger than ηφti as the input of A, and get an
allocation vector X and the corresponding payment vector P˜.
Different from the former target, the payment vector P˜ we get
in this case is virtual payments of buyers. Therefore, we need
to convert the virtual payments back into the actual payments
for buyers by the conversion of pi = φ−1i (p˜i).
As we have seen, if mechanism A is a monotonic allocation,
and it always charges each winning buyer its critical value, the
proposed auction framework is truthful. In the following, we
will show how to design a monotonic allocation method A,
which charges winners their critical values.
IV. ALLOCATION MECHANISM WITH APPROXIMATION
RATIO (1-1/e)
In this section, we propose the channel allocation mech-
anisms A under our spectrum auction framework. We first
present an optimal solution to the channel allocation problem
that maximizes the total bids or virtual bids of secondary users.
However, solving this channel allocation problem optimally is
NP-hard. To address this, we further design a set of (1− 1/e)
approximation mechanisms which can be solved in polynomial
time. By using the LP relaxation technique, we first propose
a deterministic mechanism (DCA) to get a solution whose
weight is larger than 1 − 1/e times of the optimal. Then,
we design an revise version of DCA, which called MDCA,
to make sure that our channel allocation mechanism is bid
monotone. To ensure that our payment mechanism can also
be solved in polynomial time, we further design mechanism
CATE, which is truthful in expectation.
A. The Optimal Channel Allocation
In the channel allocation problem, we need to match the
requests and channels optimally under their constraints. For
each request ri, it can only be allocated in the time slice
between ai and di. And for each channel sj , it can only
allocate time slices to the requests which are in its entire
license area. Moreover, we can only allocate a fixed time
slice to the requests conflict-free with each other. In order to
simplify the matching model between requests and channels,
we would like to segment the available time of each channel
into many time slices. Recall that the available time of each
channel is [0,T] in each auction period. Then, we use the
arrival time ai and deadline di of each request ri to partition
the time interval [0,T]. Each arrival time/deadline of requests
divides the time axis of one channel into two parts. As shown
in Figure 1, the arrival time and deadline of requests r1, r2 and
r3 divide the time interval [0,T] into 7 time slices. Suppose
there are n requests, we can easily get that the time interval
[0,T] can be divided into no more than 2n+ 1 time slices.
After the introduction of segmentation process, we give the
detailed description of the channel allocation problem. First,
0 T
a1 d1
a2 d2
a3
0 T
a1 a2 d1 d2 a3 d3
(a) Before segmentation
(b) After segmentation
d3
Fig. 1: An instance of the time interval segmentation
for each partitioned time slice derived from channel sj , it
can only be allocated to the requests within the license area
of channel sj . Let xlj,i represent whether the l-th time slice
of channel sj is allocated to the request ri, then we get a
constraint xlj,i ≤ ci,j . Second, each time slice can only be
allocated to requests conflict-free with each other. Thus, we
get another constraint
∑
k 6=i x
l
j,kyi,k,j + x
l
j,i ≤ 1. Let tlj be
the length of l-th time slice in channel sj . Modify ai to be
the first time slice ri wants to use, and di to be the last time
slice ri wants to use. Moreover, if we allocate request ri in
channel sj , the time assigned to request ri from channel sj
should be equal to the required time of request ri, so we get∑di
l=ai
xlj,it
l
j = tixi,j . From the analysis above, the allocation
problem can be formulated as follows.
max
∑
sj∈S
∑
ri∈R′
φi(bi)xi,j , (IP (1))
subject to

∑
sj∈S
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀ri ∈ R′
xlj,i ≤ ci,j , ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′, ∀l∑
k 6=i x
l
j,kyi,k + x
l
j,i ≤ 1, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′, ∀l
di∑
l=ai
xlj,it
l
j = tixi,j , ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R′
xlj,i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′, ∀l
where xi,j stands for whether channel sj is allocated to request
ri or not, yi,k,j represents whether request ri conflicts with
request rk or not.
If we can get the optimal solution of integer programming
IP(1), we can apply the best-known VCG mechanism to
design a truthful auction mechanism. In VCG mechanism,
the winner determination is to maximize the sum of winning
bids, and the payment from each buyer is the opportunity cost
that its presence introduces to all the other players. Assume
that Xopt = (xk)n is the optimal solution of IP(1), where
xk =
∑
sj∈S
xk,j , and Xopt is the allocation vector. For each
xi = 1, the corresponding payment p˜i is:
p˜i = max
X−i
∑
k 6=i
xkφk(bk)−max
X
∑
k 6=i
xkφk(bk) (2)
VCG mechanism guarantees the monotone allocation, and
it always charges each winner its critical value, so the resulted
auction mechanism is truthful. As the maximum weighted
independent set problem is a special case of the channel
allocation, thus we have
Theorem 1: The social efficiency maximization or revenue
maximization channel allocation problem is NP-hard.
Proof: For a simple case that there is one channel in
our model, we need to allocate requests in this channel with
conflict graph G , and the goal of our channel allocation
mechanism is to maximize the sum of the virtual bids.
Then, the channel allocation problem is a maximum weighted
independent set problem in this case, which is an NP-hard
problem.
Then solving the integer programming IP(1) is an NP-hard
problem, which implies that VCG mechanism is difficult to be
applied to actual auctions. In order to tackle the NP-hardness,
we employ LP relaxation methods, and further design a set of
polynomial time solvable channel allocation mechanisms with
an approximation factor of 1− 1/e.
B. (1-1/e)-Approximation methods
LP relaxation technique can be introduced to solve NP-
hard problems, and it often leads to a good approximation
algorithm. We release IP(1) to linear programming LP(2) by
replace xi,j ∈ {0, 1} with 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, and replace xlj,i ∈
{0, 1} with 0 ≤ xlj,i ≤ 1. The allocation problem can be
reformulated as:
max
∑
sj∈S
∑
ri∈R′
φi(bi)xi,j (LP(2))
subject to

∑
sj∈S
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀ri ∈ R′
xlj,i ≤ ci,j , ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′∑
k 6=i x
l
j,kyi,k + x
l
j,i ≤ 1, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′, ∀l
di∑
l=ai
xlj,it
l
j = tixi,j , ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′
0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R′
0 ≤ xlj,i ≤ 1, ∀sj ∈ S, ∀ri ∈ R
′, ∀l
Recall that the number of time slices is no more than
2n+ 1 for each channel, so LP(2) has a polynomial number
of variables and constraints, and can be solved optimally in
polynomial time.
1) Randomized Rounding: Suppose OLP2 is the optimal
solution of LP (2), we apply a standard randomized rounding
on it to obtain an integral feasible solution fIP1 to IP (1). The
rounding procedure is presented as follows.
1) Randomly choose a channel sj , randomly choose a re-
quest ri with xi,j > 0, and set xi,j = 1;
2) If xi,j = 1, set xk,j = 0 for all requests rk with yi,k,j =
1;
3) If xi,j = 1, set xi,k = 0 for all channels with k 6= j.
4) Repeat steps 1 to 3 until all requests have been processed.
Through the randomized rounding procedure above, the
optimal solution of LP(2) is converted into a feasible solution
of IP(1). Let wOLP2 be the weight of OLP2, and let E(wfIP 1)
be the expected weight of fIP1. We show in Theorem 2 that
E(wfIP 1) ≥ (1− 1/e)wOLP2 .
Theorem 2: The expected weight of the rounded solution is
at least 1− 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution to
LP (2).
Proof: For each request ri, let H = {sj ∈ S : xi,j > 0}
be the set of channels sj ∈ S with xi,j > 0, and let h =
|H |. Clearly, 0 ≤ h ≤ m. The probability that request ri is
not allocated in any channel by fIP1 is
h∏
j=1
(1− xi,j). Let qi
denote the probability that request ri is allocated in one of the
h channels by fIP1. Then, we get that qi = 1−
h∏
j=1
(1− xi,j).
It’s obvious that E(wfIP 1) = wOLP2 when h = 0 or 1. Thus,
we only consider the case h ≥ 2 in the following. In this
case, qi is minimized when xi,j = xi/h. Then, we have qi ≥
1− (1− xi/h)h, and
qi
xi
≥
1
xi
(1− (1− (xi/h)
h) ≥ (1− (1− 1/h)h) ≥ 1−
1
e
(3)
The right side of the inequality is a monotonically decreas-
ing function depending on xi, with 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1. Thus, it is
minimized when xi = 1, and we have
qi
xi
≥
1
xi
(1− (1− xi/h)
h) ≥ (1− (1 − 1/h)h)
≥ 1−
1
e
+
1
32h2
≥ 1− 1/e
(4)
For each request ri with qi > 0, its contribution in the
expected weight of the rounded solution is qiφi(bi), and that
in the weight of the optimal solution of LP(2) is xiφi(bi). Then
we have qiφi(bi)xiφi(bi) ≥ 1−
1
e . Since this inequality holds for any
request ri ∈ R′, and E(wfIP 1) =
∑
ri∈R′
qiφi(bi), wOLP2 =∑
ri∈R′
xiφi(bi), we have E(wfIP1) ≥ (1− 1/e)wOLP2 .
We have shown that the expected weight of feasible solution
fIP1 of IP (1) obtained by our randomized rounding is larger
than 1−1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution of LP
(2). Obviously, the weight of the optimal solution of LP (2),
which is denoted by wOLP2 , is larger than the optimal solution
of IP (1), which is denoted by wOIP 1 . Therefore, we can get
that
Theorem 3: The expected weight of the rounded solution is
at least 1− 1/e times of the weight of the optimal solution to
IP (1).
2) Deterministic Methods: The rounding procedure only
makes sure that the expected weight of fIP1 is larger than
1−1/e times of the weight of OLP2. What we need is to find
a feasible solution of IP (1) whose weight is exactly larger
than 1 − 1/e times of the wOLP2 . In the following, we show
that the rounding procedure can be derandomized and how the
method of conditional probabilities can be used in our setting.
Let E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) be the expected weight when request
ri is allocated in channel sj , and let E(wfIP 1 |˜i) be the
expected weight when request ri will not be allocated in any
channel. Next, we will show how our derandomize algorithm
works. We first sort all the requests by their arrival time ai in
the ascending order. Let xi =
∑
j∈S xi,j , and then scan all the
requests one by one to decide which request can be allocated
in channels. When request ri is considered, we scan all of
Algorithm 2 DCA: Derandomized Channel Allocation Based
on Linear Programming
Input: Conflict graph G, location matrix C, set of channels
S, set R′ sorted in increasing order according to ai;
Output: channel assignment X∗ ;
1: Solve LP(2) optimally;
2: E(wfIP 1) =
∑
sj∈S
φi(bi)(1−
∏
sj∈S
(1− xi,j));
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: if xi > 0 then
5: for j = 1 to m do
6: if E(wfIP 1) ≤ E(wfIP 1 |i, j) then
7: set xi,j = 1, xi = 1;
8: set all xi,k = 0 and xli,k = 0 if k 6= j;
9: set all xk,j = 0 and xlk,j = 0 if k 6= i and
yi,k,j = 1;
10: Break
11: if xi 6= 1 then
12: xi = 0;
13: return X∗;
the channels that are available for ri to check if ri can be
allocated in one of them. If E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) < E(wfIP 1),
set xi,j = 0; otherwise, allocate ri in channel sj , and set
xi,j = 1, xi = 1, xi,k = 0 if k 6= j. Meanwhile, if ri is
allocated in channel sj , we set xlk,j = 0 if yi,k,j = 1.
Suppose ri is the first request that satisfies xi > 0 in the
ordered requests. Let qi,j denote the probability that request
ri is allocated in channel sj and let qi˜ denote the probability
that ri is not allocated in any channel. By the formula for
conditional probabilities, we have
E(wfIP 1) =
∑
rj∈S
E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj)qi,j + E(wfIP 1 |˜i)qi˜ (5)
In particular, there exists at least one conditional expectation
in E(wfIP 1 |ri → s1), · · · , E(wfIP 1 |ri → sm), E(wfIP 1
|˜i), which is larger than E(wfIP 1). If it is E(wfIP 1 |ri →
sj) ≥ E(wfIP 1), we allocate request ri in channel sj ;
otherwise, E(wfIP 1 |˜i) ≥ E(wfIP1) holds, reject request ri,
and set xi,j = 0 for each sj ∈ S. This can be done
since E(wfIP 1) =
∑
ri∈R′
φi(bi)qi, and qi can be computed
precisely by
qi = 1−
∏
sj∈S
(1 − xi,j) (6)
Let qri→sj ,k stand for the probability that request rk is
allocated in a channel when request ri is allocated in sj . Then
qri→sj ,k can be calculated by
qri→sj ,k =
{
1−
∏
o 6=j (1− xk,o), yi,k,j = 1
qk, otherwise
(7)
For each request ri, we can compute E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj)
precisely as the follows
E(wfIP1 |ri → sj) = φi(bi) +
∑
k 6=i
φk(bk)qri→sj ,k (8)
Given the selections in the prior requests, we can continue
deterministically to allocate other requests and do the same
thing while maintaining the invariant that the conditional
expectation E(wfIP 1), never deceases. After allocating all of
the requests, we can get a feasible solution of IP (1) whose
weight is as good as E(wfIP 1), i.e. at least (1− 1/e)wOLP2 .
Since LP(2) can be solved in polynomial time, and we can
allocate requests in channels with time complexity O(nm) by
using the optimal solution of LP(2), we get that
Theorem 4: DCA can be executed in polynomial time.
Proof: As mentioned above, LP(2) can be solved in
polynomial time. Then, we allocate requests in channels with
time complexity O(nm) in DCA with the optimal solution of
LP(2). This finishes the proof.
Recall that to ensure the truthfulness of our auction mech-
anism, the allocation algorithm must be bid-monotone. This
means that if request ri wins the auction with bid vi, it always
wins with bid bi > vi. In Algorithm 2, request ri wins in
the auction only if there exists a channel sj which satisfies
E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) ≥ E(wfIP 1). However, it is hard to judge
that if E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) is still larger than E(wfIP1) when
request ri increases its bid. We cannot prove or disprove the
bid-monotone property of the allocation method DCA. Thus,
it is unknown whether we can design a truthful mechanism
based on this method. In the rest of the section, we revise
this method and show that the revised method does satisfy the
bid-monotone property.
Since that there exists at least one of the conditional expec-
tations between maxsj∈SE(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) and E(wfIP1
|˜i), which is larger than E(wfIP 1). Thus, if we allocate ri
in the channel with the maximal conditional expectation as
long as maxsj∈SE(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) ≥ E(wfIP 1 |˜i), and do not
allocate ri in any channel otherwise, we can also get a feasible
solution of IP (1), whose weight is as good as E(wfIP1).
This can be done since we can compute E(wfIP 1 |i, j) and
E(wfIP 1 |˜i) precisely as follows:
E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) = φi(bi) + Ek 6=i(wf ′IP1 |ri → sj) (9)
where Ek 6=i(wf ′
IP 1
|ri → sj) is the expected weight of all
other requests when request ri has been allocated in channel
sj . We can get it by allocating ri in channel sj first, and then
solve LP (2) optimally with other requests.
E(wfIP 1 |˜i) = ER′/ri(wf ′IP 1) (10)
where ER/ri(wf ′IP 1) is the expected weight of all other
requests when request ri does not be allocated in any channel.
We can get it by solving LP (2) optimally with requests except
ri.
Based on the observation above, we give an revised version
of Algorithm DCA as follows.
In MDCA, we first sort all of the requests by their arrival
times in the ascending order, and then we scan all requests one
by one to decide which request can be allocated in channels.
When request ri is considered, we compute E(wfIP 1 |ri →
sj) for all channels sj ∈ S that no request conflicting with
Algorithm 3 MDCA: Monotone Derandomized Channel Al-
location Based on Linear Programming
Input: Conflict graph G, location matrix C, set of channels
S, set of R′ sorted in increasing order according to ai;
Output: channel assignment X∗ ;
1: Solve LP(2) optimally;
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: if xi,j > 0 then
5: E(wfIP 1 |ri → sk) = maxsj∈SE(wfIP 1 |ri → sj)
6: if E(wfIP 1 |ri → sk) ≥ E(wfIP 1 |˜i) then
7: set xi,j = 1, xi = 1;
8: set all xi,k = 0 and xli,k = 0 if k 6= j;
9: set all xk,j = 0 and xlk,j = 0 if k 6= i and
yi,k,j = 1;
10: Break
11: if xi 6= 1 then
12: xi = 0;
13: return X∗;
it has been allocated in. We allocate ri in channel sk when
E(wfIP 1 |ri → sk) = maxsj∈SE(wfIP 1 |ri
→ sj) ≥ E(wfIP 1 |˜i), and reject it otherwise. After the last
request was considered in MDCA, we get a feasible solution
of IP (1), whose weight is as good as E(wfIP 1).
Theorem 5: MDCA (see Algorithm 3) is bid monotone.
Proof: Suppose request ri wins the auction with the bid
bi, and it is allocated with the channel sj , but it cannot be
allocated in any channel with the bid bi > vi. There are two
possible cases.
Case 1: maxsj∈SE(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) < E(wfIP 1 |˜i) when ri
bids some value bi with bi > vi. However, when ri increases
its bid, clearly, Ek 6=i(wf ′
IP 1
|rk → sj) and E(wfIP 1 |˜i) keep
invariant, and E(wfIP 1 |ri → sj) ≥ E(wfIP 1 |˜i) always holds
in this case. Thus, our hypothesis does not hold in this case.
Case 2: When ri is considered with the bid bi > vi, the
channel sj has been occupied by request rl, which conflicts
with ri. Obviously, rl is not allocated in sj when ri bids vi.
That means E(wfIP 1 |rl → sj) < E(wfIP 1 |l˜) or the channel
sj has been occupied by other requests which conflict with rl
but conflict-free with ri when rl was considered. In the first
subcase, the contribution of ri in E(wfIP 1 |l˜) is larger than
the contribution in E(wfIP 1 |rl → sj). Then, the increment of
E(wfIP 1 |l˜) is lager than that of E(wfIP 1 |rl → sj) when ri
increases its bid from vi to bi. Thus, rl cannot be allocated in
sj when ri bids bi > vi. Assume that rk which conflicts with
rl is allocated in sj when ri bids vi in the second subcase.
However, the contribution of ri in E(wfIP 1 |rk → sj) is no
less than the contribution in E(wfIP 1 |k˜). Thus, the increment
of E(wfIP 1 |rk → sj) is lager than that of E(wfIP 1 |k˜) when
ri increases its bid from vi to bi. rk will also be allocated in
sj when ri bids bi > vi. In conclusion, rl cannot be allocated
in sj when ri bids bi > vi.
Based on the analysis above, if ri wins the auction with a
bid vi, it always wins with the bid bi > vi.
Theorem 6: MDCA can be executed in polynomial time.
Proof: We have shown that LP(2) can be solved in
polynomial time. For each request with xi ≥ 0 in the optimal
solution of LP(2), we solve LP(2) no more than m times to
check if request ri can be allocated in a channel. Then, the
time complexity of MDCA is O(nm) multiplied by the time
complexity of solving LP(2). This finishes the proof.
Since the revised Algorithm MDCA can be executed in
polynomial time, we can find the critical value for each winner
using a method such as binary search. However, the time
complexity of binary search is depends on the ratio of the max
bid among requests to the bid size, which may exponential
times of n. It is hard to find the critical values for winners
in polynomial times. Thus, we further design another channel
allocation mechanism that is truthful in expectation.
3) Truthful in expectation: In this section, we will employ
a technique proposed by Lavi and Swamy [11] to design a
channel allocation mechanism (CATE), which achieves the
truthfulness in expectation.
The basic idea is depicted as follows. With the optimal
solution of LP(2), X = (xi)n, we can get a set of feasible
solutions of IP(1), L, by allocating some requests that xi ≥ 0
in channels. For each feasible solution l ∈ L, we define a
probability q(l) which will be discussed later, and choose l as
the final solution with probability q(l). Let xli = 1 denote that
request ri wins in solution l, and let xli = 0 denote that ri
loses. Then, if the equation
∑
l∈L xi,lq(l) =
xi
α is established
for any request ri, we can get that the probability of request
ri being assigned a channel is exactly xiα . For each winner,
the charge can be calculated as follows
pi =
1
xi
(
∑
j 6=i
φjx
′
j −
∑
j 6=i
φjxj) (11)
The vector X ′ = (x′j)n is obtained by computing LP(2)
with bi = 0. We show that this allocation mechanism and
payment scheme result in an auction, which is truthful in
expectation.
Theorem 7: CATE is truthful in expectation.
Proof: Let ui(bi) be the utility of request ri when bidding
with bi. Then, the expected utility of ri is
E[ui(bi)] =
xi
α
[vi −
1
xi
(
∑
j 6=i
φjx
′
j −
∑
j 6=i
φjxj)]
=
1
α
[vixi +
∑
j 6=i
φjxj −
∑
j 6=i
φjx
′
j ]
(12)
Since
∑
j 6=i φ(j)x
′
j keeps unchanged when we increase or
decrease the bid of ri, E[ui(bi)] is maximized when bi = vi.
That means the expected utility of ri is maximized when ri
bids truthfully.
The distribution of P (l) can be solved by the following LP.
min
∑
l∈L
q(l), (LP(3))
subject to 

∑
l∈L
xliq(l) =
xi
α , ∀ri ∈ R
′
∑
l∈L
q(l) ≥ 1
q(l) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L
The dual of LP(3) is:
max z +
∑
ri∈R′
xi
α
wi, (LP(4))
subject to 

z +
∑
ri∈R′
xliwi ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ L
z ≥ 0
Since LP(3) has an exponential number of variables, we
discuss its dual (LP(4)). LP(4) has an exponential number of
constraints, and we can view w in LP(4) as a valuation. Sup-
pose a α-approximation algorithm App proves an integrality
gap of α with the optimal solution of LP(2). It has been shown
in [11] that a separation oracle for LP(4) can be obtained by
using Algorithm App with valuation w, so the ellipsoid method
can be used to solve LP(4) and hence LP(3). In CATE, we
choose the allocation method DCA which is designed in the
last section as App. Then, we can get that α = ee−1 . Since
the probability of any request ri being assigned a channel is
exactly xiα , we can conclude that the expected weight of the
solution of CATE is larger than 1 − 1/e times of the weight
of the optimal solution of IP(1).
Theorem 8: CATE can be executed in polynomial time.
Proof: We can use ellipsoid method and mechanism DCA
on LP(4) with the optimal solution of LP(2) to compute a set
of feasible solutions of IP(1). Since the ellipsoid method takes
at most polynomial number of steps, and the mechanism DCA
can be executed in polynomial time, thus, they can be used to
return a set of solutions L in a polynomial size. Obviously,
LP(3) can also be solved in polynomial time with L in a
polynomial size. This finishes the proof.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The main purpose of our extensive simulations is to examine
the performance of the proposed auctions. We first start by
describing our simulation setup. Then, we study the setting
variance impact on the performance of the proposed auction
mechanisms.
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulation, we assume there is only one primary
user who subleases the usage of 3 channels in the spectrum
market, and the auction period T is one hour. We use the disk
model to simulate the license area of each candidate spectrum,
and the radius of license area is randomly generated from 40
to 70. All the buyers are randomly distributed within a fixed
area of 100× 100 square units. Without loss of generality, we
further assume that all the buyers’ bid values are uniformly,
exponentially or Gaussian distributed in [0, 1], and the time
duration ti for each request ri is randomly generated from 10
to 30 minutes.
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Fig. 2: Social Efficiency under Uniform Dis-
tribution
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Fig. 3: Social Efficiency under Exponential
Distribution
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Fig. 4: Social Efficiency under Gaussian Dis-
tribution
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Fig. 7: Revenue Ratio under Gaussian Distri-
bution
B. Performance analysis
We set the interference radius for each channel to be equal
to 30, and run our mechanisms under three types of bids
distributions (uniform, exponential and Gaussian) in Figures
2-7.
In Figures 2-4, we plot the social efficiency ratio of our
channel allocation mechanisms (DCA, MDCA and CATE)
and the optimal allocation mechanism. Unsurprisingly, the
performances of DCA and MDCA are better than those of
CATE. That’s because DCA and MDCA always get a solution
whose value is larger than 1− 1/e times of the optimal one,
while the solutions of CATE may be arbitrarily bad. However,
our simulation results are much better than the theoretical
bound we proved in the previous sections. Even the solution
of CATE is always larger than 70% of the optimal solution.
From Figures 2-4, we can also learn that the social efficiency
ratio is declined slightly with the increasing number of re-
quests. The reason for that is most of requests can be allocated
in channels without conflicting with others when there are
only few requests. Thus, our approximate auction mechanisms
(DCA, MDCA and CATE) perform almost as well as the
optimal one. Since the competition among requests increases
as the number of requests increases, the optimal auction
mechanism outperforms DCA, MDCA and CATE gradually.
The social efficiency ratio keeps approximately stable when
the number of requests is large enough, that is, the supply is
much less than the demand.
Observe that computing the optimal revenue is an NP-hard
problem and the optimal social efficiency is an upper bound
of revenue, we define the revenue ratio to be the ratio of the
total payments of winners and the optimal social efficiency.
Since we cannot prove that DCA is bid monotone, we cannot
compute the critical payment for each winner either. Therefore,
we only plot the revenue ratio of MDCA and CATE in
Figures 5-7. As shown in these figures, the revenue ratio of
primary user is increased with the number of requests when
the reservation price keeps unchanging. That is because the
payment of each winner in our auction mechanisms is its
critical value, which is increased with the competition among
requests.
VI. LITERATURE REVIEWS
Auction theory, regarded as a subfield of economics and
game theory, serves as an efficient, fair way to distribute scarce
resources amongst competing users. Recent years, auctions
have been extensively studied in the scope of spectrum al-
location. Many studies on spectrum auctions [7], [9], [15]
have been proposed to cope with the dynamic spectrum access
problem in different perspectives on optimization goal, such
as maximizing the total utility or minimizing the spectrum
interference.
Truthfulness (or strategyproofness) is considered as one
of the most critical factors to attract participation in the
design of auction mechanism. Nevertheless, none of the earlier
studies address this issue. Although large amount of studies
are designed aiming at achieving economical robustness (e.g.
[2], [12], [16]), these traditional auctions will lose the truthful
property when they are directly applied to spectrum auctions
due to some constraints, such as spatial and temporal reuse of
spectrum. Meanwhile, some well known auction mechanisms
(such as VCG) will lose the truthfulness when applied to
suboptimal algorithms. In [25], truthfulness is first designed
for spectrum auction, where the spatial reuse is considered.
[1] and [10] focus on maximizing revenue for the auctioneer;
[8] studies the fairness and economic feasibility in spectrum
auction model to achieve the global fairness and truthfulness;
Zhou et al. [26] first takes the McAfee double auction model
into spectrum allocation to achieve the economic robustness.
Spectrum is a local resource, and it usually trades within
its license region in a secondary markets. District mechanism
[18] first takes the spectrum locality into consideration and
proposes an economically robust double auction method. [6]
proposes a truthful auction model for heterogeneous spectrum
trading with the consideration of spectrum locality. As another
line of spectrum reuse, [4], [17], [22], [24] study the spectrum
allocation in an online model. The temporal reuse is adopted
in these online model researches. However, combination of
spectrum locality and temporal reuse is not fully mentioned in
the previous studies. Dong et al. [5] tackles spectrum auction
by introducing combinatorial auction model which achieves
time-frequency flexibility, however, the authors do not consider
spatial reuse and spectrum locality property in their work. Our
work essentially generalizes all of the above challenges in the
auction design.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the case that spectrum can
not only be reused in spatial domain, but also in temporal
domain. We have designed a general truthful spectrum auc-
tion framework which can maximize the social efficiency or
revenue. As allocating channels optimally is NP-hard in our
model, we have also proposed a set of near-optimal channel
allocation mechanisms with (1− 1/e) performance guarantee.
Several interesting questions are left for future research.
The first one is to design a spectrum auction mechanism that
can guarantee a good approximation and an efficient practical
running time. The second one is to relax the time request
model from the fixed interval model we studied in this paper
to a more general one. The third challenging question is to
design truthful mechanisms with good performance guarantee
when we have to make online decisions.
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